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Foreword
European Integration’s Extended Gestation: Forever half-pregnant
Giles Merritt
Does Europe have a collective future, or will the coming years be marked by 
increasingly incoherent developments within the heterogeneous EU? There is no 
denying that the second decade of this century has seen a strong mood shift away 
from the inter-dependence and concerted actions that guided Europe’s national 
governments since the end of World War II, and then since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
What connections, if any, are there between the paroxysms of Brexit in the UK and 
the varying shades of populism in continental Europe? The common denominator 
may simply be the painful economic pressures resulting from waning global 
competitiveness.
It is clear that the high ideals of the European project no longer exert the same 
political pull. The EU’s dreams of progressing almost seamlessly from a trading zone 
to a shared political economy are not being realised. Where are the convergence 
policies that would exert centripetal rather than centrifugal forces? Where is the 
appetite for reforms leading to political union, and whatever happened to the idea of 
Europeans speaking with one voice?
If the EU continues along its present path, the verdict of history may well be that 
it achieved little more than the welter of regulations needed to ensure trade flows. In 
geopolitical terms, Europe as a major player on the world stage may have been an 
illusion largely created by aggregating national statistics.
* * *
It is not inappropriate to start a disquisition on the problems clouding Europe’s 
future by putting Malta under the microscope, even though it accounts for only 0.1 
per cent of the European Union’s population. The Maltese microcosm tells us at a 
glance much of what awaits the whole of Europe in the 21st century’s increasingly 
difficult global environment.
We Europeans were some 15 per cent of the world’s people forty years ago, and 
now only around seven per cent. We may speak dismissively of emerging economic 
giants like China, India and Brazil, suggesting they are copy-cats who use underhand 
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methods to invade our markets, but the reality is that as well as being younger they 
are more vibrant.
Alerting Europe’s electorates to the consequences of demographic change has 
been frustratingly hard. Voters do not want to hear about it, least of all about the 
implications of ageing, so few politicians have had the courage to tell them.
Malta’s demographic roller-coaster is a useful example of the way that ageing and 
a low birth rate can radically reshape a society over a comparatively short space of 
time. Its population profile looks like an alpine peak; having risen steeply, it will also 
fall precipitously.
In 1950 there were fewer than 320,000 Maltese, and since then the population has 
increased at about fifteen times the overall rate of the EU. But it is peaking, so by 2025 
it is due to have shrunk from its present high point of 475,000 back down to 425,000. 
By the end of this century, Malta’s population will – at 340,000 – be almost back to 
the level of 150 years before.
Naturally, demographers’ projections do not always work out with total accuracy, 
but usually they beat those of economists into a cocked hat. So through the lens of 
tiny Malta we can discern the much larger picture of a radically changing European 
society and its workforce. Maltese may complain of being too crowded, yet mostly 
they accept the Government of Malta’s pronouncement that to fuel economic growth 
they need more migrant workers.
This is the situation of the European Union in a nutshell. Observers of the EU 
scene may highlight the intricacies of its institutional developments, its successive 
enlargements and its regulatory outreach, but these are of far less consequence than 
the societal shifts within the member states. The focus of the EU – the ‘Eurocrats’ of 
the commission and the MEPs – is correctly on detail, but it is nevertheless time to 
readjust that focus and bring the big picture into sharper definition.
Europe is shrinking in absolute terms as well as proportionately in a world headed 
for 10 billion people by mid-century. A head count of all Europeans, not just the EU’s 
citizens, reveals a total population of 740 million that is due to fall dramatically to 
707 million by 2050.
More than half a century of plummeting birth rates has taken its toll, leading to 
downward spirals of manpower in most parts of Europe. The next 30 years will see 
the EU’s working age population drop from the present 240 million to 207 million. 
That figure assumes that the current rate of economic migrants will be maintained; 
if not, the EU’s workforce will number only 169 million by mid-century.
The average fertility rate in Europe is now 1.6 children per couple – slightly above 
Malta’s 1.53 but far too low to reverse both the shrinkage and ageing trends now 
exerting an iron grip on the European political economy. The growth in the numbers 
of older people is not only a seemingly insoluble fiscal problem but also one that will 
challenge our basic concepts of democracy.
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How EU governments will fund the steep increases in pensioners is an open 
question. In some countries, Italy for example, the proportion of retired over-65s 
to the total population will rise from 2.7 per cent today to 18.8 per cent in 2050. For 
Europe as a whole, the ‘dependency ratio’ of working age people to pensioners will, 
over the 40 years to mid-century, have halved from 4:1 to 2:1.
State-funded pension systems are already creaking, and it is hard to see how they 
can survive in their present form. The OECD foresees crippling burdens on national 
economies, reckoning that by 2060 the gap between pension costs and contributions 
will average some 10 per cent of an OECD member country’s GDP.
That looks unsustainable, and yet it is only half of the equation. The other half 
is the political implications of the coming ‘generations war’. How willing will 
today’s ‘millennials’ be to pay for Europe’s ageing when they are themselves under-
privileged? And what will be the response of the under-50s to finding themselves 
electoral minorities in most EU countries?
The temptation is to use EU-wide statistics when discussing Europe’s demographic 
difficulties, but these cloak a greater problem. The nations of Europe are being 
divided by population shifts, with the winners and losers from the free movement of 
people widening the wealth gaps the EU had set out to narrow.
Southern Europe’s outlook is far from sunny. Portugal may, by 2060, see its 
population dwindle by 40 per cent, reducing from 10.5 million in 2010 to 6.3 million. 
Spain’s present 47 million will by mid-century drop 11 per cent, or 5.3 million fewer 
people; while Italy’s population of 62 million will decline to 55 million.
These future decreases are comparatively modest when set against the hemorrhaging 
of people from the EU’s newcomer states. The eleven formerly communist countries 
have seen their combined populations drop to 103 million from 111 million, while the 
Baltic states have suffered an overall 25 per cent reduction. Romania’s outlook is even 
worse: it faces a population cut of one third by 2060.
European public opinion has so far reacted to such projections with massive 
indifference, but that may be about to change. What will certainly stir protest and 
demands for new policies and more effective actions is the looming healthcare crisis 
threatening most parts of Europe. By the end of 2019, approaching a quarter of a 
million medical doctors will have stopped practising, reducing their numbers from 
1.8 million to 1.57 million.
A combination of early retirements, inadequate medical training arrangements, 
and an increasingly ailing population of older people is creating a perfect storm. In 
Austria, 40 per cent of doctors will have taken retirement by 2025, and the pattern is 
similar across Europe. Ageing is hitting the healthcare sector too, with almost four 
doctors in ten now over 55 years old.
The writing has been on the wall for some time. The WHO’s analysts rang their 
alarm bells almost 15 years ago, and the European Commission followed up with 
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a Green Paper and an ‘Action Plan’. These were generally ignored, most probably 
because the health services of the richer western European countries were able to tap 
the new resource of healthcare workers from the new member states.
In its way, the coming healthcare crisis illustrates the impotence and even 
irrelevance of the EU and its institutions. Critics accuse Brussels of wanting to 
create a European super-state, but in truth its powers have been steadily sapped by 
its member governments. EU leaders meet more frequently than ever to confer as 
the European Council, but they do so because they have to wrestle with problems 
stemming from reduced rather than greater intra-EU cohesion.
What, then, does the future hold for the great political experiment of European 
integration? Is the basis of sixty years of peace and enlargement strong enough 
to relaunch the project? Will external pressures ranging from security dangers to 
failing technological supremacy awaken national politicians to the merits of EU 
cooperation?
The auguries are discouraging. Just as the Great War of 1914–18 is widely seen as 
the point at which the 20th century began, the worldwide financial crisis of 2008 
seems to have characterised this century of rising Asia. Yet rather than respond to 
the new international conditions that redefine even the largest and most influential 
EU states as small countries, Europe’s governments have reduced their collaboration, 
preferring to go their separate ways.
When Jean-Claude Juncker took over as President of the European Commission 
in autumn 2014, he labelled his five-year mandate a “last chance” for Europe, and 
promised bold new policies to stimulate investment and light red tape bonfires. 
The consensus amongst commentators, however, is that the EU has failed to kick-
start investment and faster growth and has not delivered on goals that ranged from 
banking reforms to ambitious energy and digital market initiatives.
The EU’s member states must bear much of the blame, with unforeseeable 
factors like the 2015–16 ‘migrant crisis’ also playing a part. Now, the talk in national 
chancelleries is of a fresh start, with four areas to have top priority up to 2024.
The thinking is that Europe must, above all, recover its global leadership on 
environmental disciplines to combat climate change. On top of that it must tackle 
eurozone reform, the twin problems of ageing and migration and, not least, the 
many challenges of the Digital Age.
These are the preoccupations of policymakers and business leaders, but what of 
Europeans who increasingly are voting for populist and often anti-EU parties? What 
do citizens want, and how much support are they prepared to give to a mechanism 
many see as distant, unelected and unresponsive?
Complex cross-currents were revealed in a survey conducted for my own Brussels-
based think-tank ‘Friends of Europe’. When the pollsters questioned 11,000 people 
across all EU member states, they received some surprising answers. Four-fifths 
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oppose “less Europe” and moves to hand some of the EU’s powers back to national 
governments, while an overwhelming nine-tenths would not want to see any return 
to a mere trade zone.
At the same time, almost half questioned the EU’s relevance to their own lives, 
and two-thirds thought that they would not be much worse off if the EU were to 
somehow disappear overnight. Yet 40 per cent would like an internet-enabled vote 
on EU-level issues, 25 per cent would like to directly elect EU commission presidents, 
and 20 per cent would welcome a voice in how EU money is spent.
These are not ideas that get much play in the EU’s attempts to gauge public opinion, 
notably its Eurobarometer polling. But they reflect the way Europeans’ attitudes and 
expectations are becoming more complicated and fragmented.
A further complication, making discussion of Europe’s future akin to a game of 
three-dimensional chess, is the growing debate among member states over whether 
there should be a two-speed EU. Advocates of an inner core of ‘progressive’ countries 
and an outer ring of ‘conservative’ argue that it is the only realistic solution.
Set against concerns that a two-speed Europe entailing first-class and second-class 
citizens would spell the end of the EU, there is the reminder that this is already the 
case. Thirty years ago, the discussions leading up to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
clearly set out the fact that creating the euro as a common currency would mean that 
countries with a derogation from eurozone membership would be in an outer ring.
It was also an integral element of the EU enlargement negotiations that the mostly 
ex-communist countries could not, or should not, adopt the euro. That is more or 
less where we still are, with roughly three-fifths of EU countries in the inner core 
of the eurozone. What was not understood at that time, though, was that the single 
currency would create economic divergences between countries rather than the 
convergence promised by its creators.
The upshot is that Europe is now riven by deep divisions, some of them inherent in 
the problems created by one-size-fits-all policies, others aggravated by the decade of 
austerity measures introduced in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.
The north-south split between the ‘Club Med’ countries and the richer northern 
and Scandinavian countries has been further widened by the sharp differences that 
now exist between Paris and Berlin on reforming the eurozone. Germany, backed 
by the Netherlands, staunchly opposes new collective debt ideas. As the euro’s chief 
beneficiary, it may be signing its eventual death warrant.
There is also the east-west schism. The six founding member states together 
with those other richer countries that made up western Europe’s EU-15 treated 
the newcomers of the 2004 ‘Big Bang’ enlargement in a somewhat cavalier and 
condescending manner. They are now reaping the whirlwind of the seeds sown 
then, with the Visegrad states not alone in warning they will use the veto powers of 
membership to avoid the EU’s “interference” in matters they consider “sovereign”.
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There seem two possible outcomes: either the EU’s inertia and inability to grasp 
political nettles leads to an unsatisfactory business-as-usual approach, or there 
is disruptive reform. The former means the present frictions will persist and will 
probably be accentuated by widely projected stagnant economic growth.
The latter course of reform might lance many boils of discontent, but would open 
up bitter re-negotiations over what it means to be European. The outer ring of 
countries no longer to be bound by the most unyielding of EU disciplines would be 
relegated to a different legal framework and all that this implies.
These possibilities have not so far impinged greatly on public opinion. If and when 
they do so they will certainly stoke doubts over the value of the European ‘project’. 
The background for many Europeans is security, and a sense that the EU is not 
delivering the stability and sense of foreign policy coherence they had been led to 
expect.
The migration issue has been throwing into stark relief the volatilities of the 
Middle East, the Gulf region and northern Africa. It has shown how far from reality 
are Europe’s foreign affairs ambitions. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
in spite of its creation of a ‘foreign ministry’ in the shape of its EEAS action service, 
clearly remains much more a trade and economic arm than a diplomatic one.
Successive opinion polls have shown that there is much support for a more muscular 
EU, with respondents apparently yearning for “a European army”. As with so much 
of the Great Debate over Europe’s future, such simple solutions would raise hugely 
complicated new questions over the political mechanisms that would be needed.
In other words, Europe remains in the place its policymakers have always feared 
and denied: it is half-pregnant.
